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2The Supremacy Clause as a
Constraint on Federal Power
Bradford R. Clark*
It is . . . not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be
the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the
laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance
of the constitution, have that rank.1
Introduction
Today, it is widely accepted that the Constitution authorizes courts to review and invalidate
state laws that conflict with federal statutes.  At the same time, prominent commentators and even
some judges maintain that courts should not seriously review the constitutionality of federal statutes
alleged to exceed the scope of Congress' enumerated powers.  Opponents of such review offer two
grounds for this dichotomy.  First, they argue that the Constitution specifically directs courts to
uphold "the supreme Law of the Land" notwithstanding state law "to the Contrary,"2  but contains no
express authority for courts to enforce the limits of federal power.  Second, they invoke the political
safeguards of federalism—that is, "the role of the states in the composition and selection of the
central government."3  In their view, the constitutional structure protects the states (and thereby
reduces the need for judicial review of federal power), but establishes no comparable safeguards to
deter states from interfering with federal prerogatives.4
Contrary to these arguments, however, there is an express textual basis for judicial review of
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     1Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
     2U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
     3Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism:  The Role of the States in the Composition and
Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 558 (1954).
     4See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS:  A FUNCTIONAL
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980); Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National
Power Vis-à-Vis the States:  The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977); Larry D.
Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword:  We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001)
[hereinafter Kramer, We the Court]; Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards
of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000) [hereinafter Kramer, Politics].
3federal statutes alleged to exceed Congress' enumerated powers.  The Supremacy Clause establishes
a rule of decision for courts adjudicating the rights and duties of parties under both state and federal
law.  As the Supreme Court has recognized, "under our federal system, the States possess
sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government, subject only to limitations imposed by
the Supremacy Clause."5  The Clause, in turn, designates as "the supreme Law of the Land" only
those "Laws of the United States . . . made in Pursuance" of the Constitution.6  If a federal statute
satisfies this condition, courts must apply the statute notwithstanding contrary state law.  If the
federal statute fails this condition, however, it does not qualify as "the supreme Law of the Land"
and courts remain free to apply state law.  Thus, in order to apply the Supremacy Clause, courts must
necessarily consider and resolve challenges to the constitutionality of federal statutes.
The text, history, and structure of the Constitution confirm that the Supremacy Clause
authorizes judicial review of federal statutes alleged to exceed the scope of federal power.7  The
Founders considered three alternative mechanisms for resolving conflicts between state and federal
law:  coercive military force, congressional power to negative state laws, and adjudication under the
Supremacy Clause.  The decision to enlist courts—rather than Congress or the President—indicates
that the Founders preferred to treat conflicts between state and federal law as judicial, rather than
political questions.  In addition, by expressly conditioning the supremacy of federal statutes on their
constitutionality, the Supremacy Clause reassured the states that courts (both federal and state)
would keep the federal government within the bounds of its assigned powers.  Thus, in effect, the
Clause reserves all remaining powers to the states, or to the people.8
This Article has four Parts.  Part I describes the apparent double standard of judicial review
in federalism cases, under which courts vigorously review state law alleged to conflict with federal
statutes but decline to subject federal statutes alleged to exceed the scope of Congress' enumerated
powers to serious constitutional scrutiny.  Part II examines the text, history, and structure of the
Constitution and concludes that the Supremacy Clause conditions the supremacy of federal statutes
on their constitutionality.  Part III reassesses the double standard of judicial review in light of the
conditional nature of the Supremacy Clause.  Contrary to recent scholarship, this Part concludes that
the Constitution expressly authorizes courts to identify "the supreme Law of the Land" by
determining whether federal statutes invoked by the parties were "made in Pursuance" of the
Constitution.  Finally, Part IV finds support for these conclusions in the Supreme Court's early
invocation of the Supremacy Clause to support judicial review of federal statutes in cases like
                    
     5Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990).
     6U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  "Laws" in this context refer to measures enacted by Congress pursuant to
Article I, Section 7.  See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 1321, 1334-36 (2001) [hereinafter Clark, Separation of Powers].
     7This Article examines the text, history, and structure of the Constitution not to suggest that such sources
are necessarily determinative of constitutional meaning, but to refute suggestions by commentators that the
Founders did not understand the Constitution to authorize judicial review of the scope of federal power.
     8Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. X.  In this sense, the Tenth Amendment—adopted after the Supremacy Clause—
states "but a truism" inherent in the original Constitution.  United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
4McCulloch v. Maryland9 and Gibbons v. Ogden.10
I. The Double Standard of Judicial Review in Federalism Cases
The modern tendency to overlook the Supremacy Clause as a textual basis for judicial
review of both state and federal statutes has facilitated the development of a double standard of
judicial review.  The Supreme Court has long invoked the Clause to invalidate state law that
conflicts with federal statutes or that "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress."11  At the same time, the Court has generally upheld
increasingly expansive exercises of congressional power, and suggested that there are few—if any—
judicially enforceable limits on such power.12
Commentators have attempted to justify this double standard of judicial review largely by
invoking the political safeguards of federalism and embracing a one-sided view of the Supremacy
Clause.  For example, Herbert Wechsler observed that "the national political process in the United
States—and especially the role of the states in the composition and selection of the central
government—is intrinsically well adapted to retarding or restraining new intrusions by the center on
the domain of the states."13  Professor Wechsler did not go so far as to deny the existence of judicial
review, but he suggested that such "political safeguards of federalism" warrant judicial deference to
Congress' view of its own powers.  As he put it, "the Court is on weakest ground when it opposes its
interpretation of the Constitution to that of Congress in the interest of the states, whose
representatives control the legislative process and, by hypothesis, have broadly acquiesced in
sanctioning the challenged Act of Congress."14  At the same time, Wechsler defended more vigorous
scrutiny of state law under the Supremacy Clause.  He reasoned that the "prime function envisaged
for judicial review—in relation to federalism—was the maintenance of national supremacy against
nullification or usurpation by the individual states, the national government having no part in their
composition or their councils."15
                    
     9McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
     10Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
     11Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947) (endorsing preemption when a federal statute touches "a field in which the federal interest is so
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject").
     12See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
     13Wechsler, supra note 3, at 558.
     14Id. at 559.  Unlike his successors, Professor Wechsler specifically recognized the relationship between the
Supremacy Clause and judicial review of the scope of federal power.  See id. ("This is not to say that the Court
can decline to measure national enactments by the Constitution when it is called upon to face the question in
the course of ordinary litigation; the supremacy clause governs there as well.").  For a discussion of Professor
Wechsler's subsequent and more expansive explanation of the constitutional basis for judicial review, see infra
notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
     15Wechsler, supra note 3, at 559.
5Several decades later, Jesse Choper restated and expanded Professor Wechsler's thesis. 
Choper urged courts to distinguish sharply between judicial review of federal statutes and judicial
review of state law.  In Professor Choper's view, "the constitutional issue whether federal action is
beyond the authority of the central government and thus violates `states' rights' should be treated as
nonjusticiable, with final resolution left to the political branches."16  Choper's rationale was both
structural and strategic.  Like Wechsler, Choper relied on the states' role in selecting Congress and
the President.  In addition, he argued that dispensing with judicial review in favor of the states
"would husband the Supreme Court's scarce political capital, and thus would enhance the Justices'
ability to act in support of personal liberties."17  According to Professor Choper, these arguments do
not apply to judicial review of state law because "the predominant role envisaged for the Court in
this area was to prevent state encroachments on national supremacy."18  Choper reasoned that "`the
people of all the States, and the States themselves, are represented in Congress,'" but that "[s]tate and
local legislatures contain no such representatives of the central government."19
Even on its own terms, the political safeguards approach suggested by Professors Wechsler
and Choper is open to serious question.  Lewis Kaden was the first to point out that changed
circumstances have diluted whatever protection the political safeguards may have once afforded the
states.20  These changes include the direct election of senators under the Seventeenth Amendment,
popular election of presidential electors in each state, and increasing constraints on the states' ability
to draw congressional districts and set voter qualifications.21   Such changes have undermined the
                    
     16Choper, supra note 4, at 1557.
     17Id. at 1577.
     18CHOPER, supra note 4, at 205.
     19Id. at 206 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 435 (1819)).  The assumption that the federal
government lacks influence over composition and selection of state governments is now open to question.
Although the original Constitution gave the federal government virtually no role in the composition of state
governments, subsequent legal developments—such as the Civil War amendments, the Voting Rights Act,
and judicial decisions—have given the federal government increasing influence over state districting and voter
qualifications.  Were courts to accept the political safeguards approach, these changes might counsel against
judicial review of state law.  At the same time, various legal developments have steadily reduced the states'
ability to influence the composition and selection of the federal government.  See infra notes 21-25 and
accompanying text.
     20See Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty:  The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
847, 860-68 (1979).  In addition, Henry Monaghan has observed that "Choper's empirical argument that
adjudicating claims of this sort weakens the Court's ability to protect civil liberties seems entirely speculative
and out of touch with the flow of our constitutional history."  Henry P. Monaghan, Book Review, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 296, 301 (1980).
     21See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 6, at 1369 (explaining that "changed circumstances have
undermined the political safeguards of federalism inherent in the original constitutional scheme"); Michael C.
Dorf, No Federalists Here:  Anti-Federalism and Nationalism on the Rehnquist Court, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 741,
747 (2000) (explaining that "with the Seventeenth Amendment's shift to the direct election of senators and the
general nationalization of congressional politics, members of Congress are not especially tethered to their
6efficacy of the political safeguards and make substitution of such safeguards for judicial review
questionable at best.22
More fundamentally, John Yoo has made a strong case that the history and structure of the
Constitution establish the propriety of judicial review to police the bounds of federal power. 
Relying on sources from the founding era, Professor Yoo concludes that the "political safeguards
argument is an ahistorical one."23  According to Yoo, examination of the historical materials
supports the conclusion that "the Framers—both Federalists and Anti-Federalists—understood the
text and structure of the Constitution to permit judicial review in cases questioning the scope of
federal power."24  More recently, Professors Prakash and Yoo have argued that the political
safeguards of federalism are not "perfect safeguard[s] of federalism," and that judicial review was
meant to "play backup to Congress, to ensure that any unconstitutional legislation that emerges from
the political process . . . will not survive."25
Attempting to sidestep the force of these criticisms, Larry Kramer has urged the expansion of
the political safeguards approach to encompass mechanisms outside the original constitutional
structure.  Professor Kramer acknowledges that "subsequent experience and later developments have
robbed [Wechsler's] analysis of much, if not all, of its force."26  Nonetheless, Kramer essentially
maintains that Professor Wechsler was right for the wrong reasons.27
                                                                 
states"); Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers":  In Defense of United
States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 794 (1995) (arguing that the political safeguards approach is
"hopelessly out of touch with the realities of the modern political process"); see also Lynn A. Baker & Ernest
A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 87-133 (arguing in
favor of judicial review in federalism cases and refuting various rationales for leaving such questions to the
political process); Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back Into the Political Safeguards of Federalism,
46 VILL. L. REV. 951, 961-962 (2001) (questioning whether the political safeguards of federalism are capable
of protecting states against "horizontal aggrandizement"—that is, the attempt by some states "to use federal
power as an instrument for imposing their preferences on other states").
     22The Court itself has further undermined the political safeguards of federalism by invalidating both state
attempts to limit the number of terms that senators and representatives may serve, see U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995), and state attempts to instruct senators and representatives how to vote on a
proposed constitutional amendment establishing congressional term limits, see Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510
(2001).
     23John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1357 (1997).
     24Id. at 1391.
     25Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories,
79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1479 (2001) [hereinafter Prakash & Yoo, Puzzling Persistence].  For a more
comprehensive explanation of the origins of judicial review, see Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The
Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming Summer 2003) [hereinafter Prakash & Yoo,
Origins of Judicial Review].
     26Kramer, Politics, supra note 4, at 218.
     27Id. at 219 ("The basic intuition of Wechsler's pathbreaking article thus remains sound, even if the reasons
for its vitality are not those offered by Professor Wechsler himself.").
7Rather than the formal constitutional structures highlighted in Wechsler's original
analysis, federalism in the United States has been safeguarded by a complex system
of informal political institutions (of which political parties have historically been the
most important)—institutions that were not part of the original design, but have
nevertheless served to fulfill its objectives.28
Political parties, he contends, "protected the states by making national officials dependent upon state
and local party organizations."29  In addition, Kramer asserts that "no one in the Founding generation
would have imagined that courts could or should play a prominent role in defining the limits of
federal power."30  Thus, Kramer concludes that the original understanding of judicial review,
combined with the extra-constitutional mechanisms he identifies, allow the Supreme Court to apply
no more than "rational basis scrutiny to questions regarding the limits of Congress' power under
Article I."31
At the same time, Professor Kramer embraces more vigorous judicial review of state law.  In
so doing, Kramer has presumably concluded that extra-constitutional mechanisms like political
                    
     28Id.  See also Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity:  Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1011, 1024 (2000) ("[T]he political safeguards today are strongly buttressed by, if not
primarily located in, a complex web of extra-constitutional political institutions (like political parties and
organizations representing state and local governments) and complex connections among officials in parties,
organizations, and the various levels of governments.").
     29Kramer, Politics, supra note 4, at 278. Kramer's suggestion is that dependence on state and local political
parties makes federal elected officials sensitive to local concerns.  Such officials are well positioned to
safeguard state prerogatives because federal lawmaking procedures "assign lawmaking functions solely to the
federal elected officials that Kramer identifies as indebted to the states (i.e., the President and members of the
House and Senate)."  Bradford R. Clark, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 80 TEX. L. REV. 327, 337 (2001).  It follows that commentators who rely on the political
safeguards to restrict judicial review in federalism cases should embrace judicial review to enforce the
exclusivity of federal lawmaking procedures.  The reason is simple.  "If the federal government were free to
evade federal lawmaking procedures by shifting substantial lawmaking authority to unelected officials (such
as independent agencies or federal courts), then Kramer's argument . . . would lose much, if not all, of its
force."  Id. Therefore, there is substantial tension, for example, between Professor Choper's proposals to treat
both federalism and separation-of-powers questions as nonjusticiable.  See CHOPER, supra note 4, at 175, 263.
     30Kramer, Politics, supra note 4, at 235. Contrary to Professor Kramer's suggestion, the rise of political
parties may have actually undermined—rather than facilitated—the states' ability to keep the federal
government within the limits of its enumerated powers.  Because state officials are so closely aligned with
national political parties, they may frequently fail to fight for the governance prerogatives of the states in order
to support federal initiatives favored by the parties.
     31Id. at 291.  See also Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy:  May Congress
Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1086 (1995) ("[T]here is
reason to believe that the concerns for state autonomy are effectively voiced in the national political
process.").
8parties do not suffice to protect the federal government from state interference.32  Kramer's
explanation for distinguishing judicial review of state and federal law is that "[t]he subject of judicial
review did come up in Philadelphia, but in connection with the problem of controlling the states, not
Congress."33  In Kramer's view, "the Supremacy Clause indicates that the Framers believed courts
could play a role in enforcing the Constitution against the states," but says nothing about judicial
review of federal statutes alleged to exceed the scope of Congress' enumerated powers.34
These commentators are not alone in urging a double standard of judicial review.  In recent
years, some members of the Supreme Court have invoked the political safeguards of federalism to
justify lax judicial review of federal statutes, while continuing to subject state statutes to searching
judicial scrutiny.  In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,35 for example, the Court
overruled its earlier decision limiting Congress' ability to regulate the "states as states."36  Citing
Wechsler and Choper, the Court observed "that the composition of the Federal Government was
designed in large part to protect the States from overreaching by Congress."37  The Court reasoned
that "[s]tate sovereign interests . . . are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in
the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power."38  The
Court's reasoning—if not its actual practice—suggests that courts should no longer review federal
statutes to determine if they fall within the scope of federal power.39
                    
     32Today, one might argue that state officials are as dependent on national political parties as federal
officials are on state parties.
     33Id. at 242.
     34Id. at 243.  Like Professor Choper, Professor Kramer distinguishes judicial review of the scope of federal
powers from judicial review to enforce the Bill of Rights.  In his view, "[t]he Framers of the Constitution
expected, and may even have hoped, that judges would be active in reviewing the constitutionality of" federal
statutes alleged to violate the Bill of Rights.  Id. at 287-88.  See also Kramer, We the Court, supra note 4, at
125 (stating that "while the Founders believed that the provisions delegating powers were not proper subjects
for judicial involvement, many of them thought otherwise when it came to the rights-bearing provisions").
     35Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
     36National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
     37Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-51.
     38Id. at 552.  Of course, Garcia's reliance on the political safeguards of federalism is subject to the same
criticisms leveled at Professors Wechsler and Choper.  See Vikram David Amar, Some Questions and
Answers Concerning Justice Blackmun in Federalism and Separation of Powers Cases, 26 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 153, 155 (1998) (concluding that "of the four most important structural safeguards Justice Blackmun
cited, one is pretty trivial, one never existed, and two have ceased to meaningfully exist by 1985") (citations
omitted).  Taken at face value, therefore, "Garcia represents a puzzling abdication of judicial responsibility." 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1247 (1988); see also id.
("Sensible judicial federalism almost always requires line-drawing between state and federal interests. This
being so, there is no more justification for judicial abandonment of that role here than there would be
elsewhere.").
     39A careful reading of Garcia reveals that the Court's embrace of the political safeguards approach was
9Although the Supreme Court has not relied on the political safeguards approach since
Garcia, four current members of the Court appear to support that approach.  Recent decisions
invalidating federal statutes on the ground that they exceed Congress' enumerated powers have
provoked strong dissents urging greater reliance on the political safeguards of federalism.  In United
States v. Morrison,40 for example, four Justices invoked the political safeguards to support broad
judicial deference to a federal statute enacted under the Commerce Clause.41  Citing Garcia, Justice
Souter's dissent (joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer) stressed "the importance of
national politics in protecting the States' interests,"42 and concluded that "the Constitution remits
[conflicts of sovereign political interests] to politics."43  Similarly, Justice Breyer's dissent (joined by
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg) cited Professor Kramer's work to support the proposition
that "Congress, not the courts, must remain primarily responsible for striking the appropriate
state/federal balance."44
                                                                 
largely illusory.  At the outset of its opinion, the Court itself reviewed the scope of Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause, and concluded that if the local transit system were "a privately owned and operated
enterprise, it could not credibly argue that Congress exceeded the bounds of its Commerce Clause powers." 
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 537.  The primary issue before the Court, therefore, was whether the transit authority's
"status as a [state] entity" gave rise to a special "constitutional exemption" from federal power.  Id.  The Court
did not evade this question, but proceeded to answer it.  On the merits, the Court upheld the statute, finding no
constitutional "limitations on federal power."  Id. at 552.  It was in this context that the Court instructed states
to look to the "procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system" for additional protection.
Id.  In short, Garcia did not invoke the political safeguards of federalism as a substitute for—but rather as a
supplement to—judicial review.  See Jesse H. Choper, Federalism and Judicial Review:  An Update, 21
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 577, 579 (1994) ("The reach of the [Garcia] Court's doctrine . . . was specifically
confined to national regulation of the `States as States'; it clearly did not apply . . . to federal regulation of
private persons or activities within the states.").  Subsequent cases support this reading of Garcia.  See United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000) (invalidating a federal statute under the Commerce Clause);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (same).
     40U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
     41See Henry Paul Monaghan, A Legal Giant Is Dead, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1370, 1372 (2000) (noting that
the political safeguards approach "has always resonated in our constitutional jurisprudence, and most recently,
it played a significant role in the opinions of the four dissenting justices in United States v. Morrison").  See
also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 96 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part) (joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) (stating that "once Congress has made its policy
choice, the sovereignty concerns of the several States are satisfied, and the federal interest in evenhanded
enforcement of federal law, explicitly endorsed in Article VI of the Constitution, does not countenance further
limitations").
     42Morrison, 529 U.S. at 648 (Souter, J., dissenting).
     43Id. at 649 (Souter, J., dissenting).  On the other hand, Justice Souter insisted in a footnote that "[p]olitics
has legitimate authority . . . only within the legitimate compass of the commerce power," id. at 652 n.19
(Souter, J., dissenting), but he defined that power so broadly in light of modern economic conditions that
virtually every "choice to legislate nationally" would "be a political choice and only a political choice," id.
     44Id. at 660 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Notwithstanding Justice Breyer's apparent approval of Professor
10
Like their academic counterparts, the Morrison dissenters would sharply distinguish between
judicial review of state and federal law under the Supremacy Clause.  In Crosby v. National Foreign
Trade Council,45 for example, the Court unanimously voted to invalidate a Massachusetts law
barring state entities from purchasing goods and services from companies doing business with
Burma.  Justice Souter's opinion on behalf of the Court reasoned that "[b]ecause the state Act's
provisions conflict with Congress' specific [statutory scheme,] . . . it is preempted, and its application
is unconstitutional, under the Supremacy Clause."46  Thus, the Morrison dissenters freely invoke the
Supremacy Clause to invalidate state laws alleged to interfere with federal prerogatives, but
apparently see little or no role for the Clause in reviewing federal statutes alleged to exceed the
scope of federal powers.
II. The Conditional Nature of the Supremacy Clause
Relying on the political safeguards of federalism to restrict judicial review of federal statutes
overlooks the conditional nature of the Supremacy Clause.  Contrary to modern assumptions, the
Clause does not allow courts to separate judicial review of state law from judicial review of contrary
state law.  Rather, whenever federal statutes conflicts with a federal statute, the Clause makes
judicial review of state law contingent on judicial review of the federal statute itself.  Specifically,
the Clause recognizes only three sources of law as "the supreme Law of the Land":  the
"Constitution," "Laws," and "Treaties" of the United States.  Not every federal "Law," however,
qualifies under the Clause.  Rather, the Clause encompasses only "the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance" of the Constitution.  Although not generally recognized today for
its dual purpose, the Clause pursues two distinct goals simultaneously:  to secure the supremacy of
federal law and to prevent Congress from exceeding the scope of its enumerated powers.  As
discussed below, the text, history, and structure of the Constitution all tend to confirm that the
Supremacy Clause enlists courts to police the bounds of federal power in the course of upholding
"the supreme Law of the Land."
                                                                 
Kramer's thesis, it is possible to read the dissent as undertaking judicial review and concluding on the merits
that Congress' commerce power is essentially unlimited.  In either case, Justice Breyer's dissent represents
something of a departure from his approach just five years earlier in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995).  There, Breyer made no mention of the political safeguards of federalism, and declared that "we must
judge the matter independently."  Id. at 624 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Breyer seemed to
embrace the idea of judicially enforceable limits on federal power.  Thus, he steadfastly maintained that "[t]o
hold this statute constitutional is not to . . . hold that the Commerce Clause permits the Federal Government"
to regulate any local activity.  Id.  In Morrison, by contrast, Justice Breyer stressed that scientific,
technological, commercial, and economic "changes, taken together, mean that virtually every kind of activity,
no matter how local, genuinely can affect commerce."  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 660 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
According to Justice Breyer, "that fact makes it close to impossible for courts to develop meaningful
subject-matter categories that would exclude some kinds of local activities from ordinary Commerce Clause
`aggregation' rules."  Id.
     45Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
     46Id. at 388.
11
A. Text
Commentators generally overlook the Supremacy Clause as a textual basis for judicial
review of federal statutes alleged to exceed Congress' enumerated powers.  Rather, they generally
assume that the Clause is concerned solely with judicial review of state law alleged to conflict with
the "Constitution," "Laws," and "Treaties" of the United States.47  Even those who support judicial
review of federal statutes typically locate such power in the structure and history of the Constitution
rather than a specific provision of the constitutional text.  Professors Prakash and Yoo, for example,
ground judicial review in "the concept of a limited, written Constitution and the existence of a
judiciary."48  Others invoke the "original intent," without tying such intent to the actual text adopted
by the Founders.  For instance, an influential casebook supports judicial review by observing that
"[t]he existence of a judicial safeguard against unconstitutional federal laws was . . . recognized on
both sides in the debates over the proposal for a council of revision of acts of the national
legislature."49  One need not rely on structure and history alone, however, to support judicial review
of the scope of federal power.  Upon examination, the Supremacy Clause appears to constitute an
express textual basis for such review.
The first half of the Supremacy Clause provides that "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land."50  Although
the Clause does not explicitly tie the supremacy of "Treaties" to their constitutionality, the Clause
conditions the supremacy of federal "Laws" on their being "made in Pursuance" of the
Constitution.51  By its terms, therefore, the Supremacy Clause suggests that courts should prefer
federal statutes to contrary state law only if the statutes themselves fall within the scope of Congress'
enumerated powers.
                    
     47See supra notes 11-19 and accompanying text.
     48Prakash & Yoo, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 25, at 1505.  More recently, Professors Prakash and
Yoo have explained that the text of the Supremacy Clause supports the idea that the courts must refuse to
enforce federal legislation that is at odds with the Constitution.  See Prakash & Yoo, Origins of Judicial
Review, supra note 25.
     49RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 12 (4th ed. 1996).
     50U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
     51See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) ("Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land
only when made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the
authority of the United States.").  Scholars continue to debate the extent to which the federal government may
adopt treaties that either exceed the scope of Congress' enumerated powers or otherwise violate the
Constitution.  See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390
(1998) (criticizing the "nationalist view" of the treaty power); David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the
Nation:  The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV.
1075 (2000) (defending the "nationalist view" of the treaty power); Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and
American Federalism, Part II, 99 MICH. L. REV. 98 (2000) (critiquing Professor Golove's analysis).
12
Under the Constitution, the states retain general legislative competence to regulate persons
and property within their respective territories.  At the same time, the Constitution delegates specific
powers to the federal government to regulate matters of national concern.  The nature of enumerated
powers suggests that the states retain exclusive authority to govern at least some inherently local
activities.  Conversely, the Constitution gives the federal government exclusive power to regulate
certain matters, most notably those relating to foreign relations, war, and peace.52  Generally
speaking, however, "with respect to a broad array of matters, the Constitution recognizes
overlapping state and federal sovereignty to establish governing rules of decision."53  The Founders
recognized that such concurrent authority would inevitably give rise to conflicts between state and
federal law.  The Supremacy Clause establishes a basis for resolving such conflicts by designating
certain categories of federal law as "the supreme Law of the Land."  Thus, in order to decide whether
to apply a particular federal statute in lieu of contrary state law, a court must first determine whether
the statute in question qualifies as "the supreme Law of the Land"—that is, whether the statute was
"made in Pursuance" of the Constitution.
At a minimum, therefore, the Supremacy Clause appears to authorize courts to review the
constitutionality of federal statutes as part of the process of resolving conflicts between such statutes
and positive state law.54   The Clause, however, may authorize judicial review of federal statutes in
other circumstances as well.  Arguably, any federal statute that alters common law rights and duties
applicable in a state is capable of triggering judicial review under the Supremacy Clause.  According
to Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,55 "whether the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a
statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern."56  As far as federal
courts are concerned, both sources of state law supply "the law to be applied in any case,"57 unless
and until preempted by "the supreme Law of the Land."  Thus, a court arguably has no warrant to
disregard even the most trivial common law right in favor of a federal statute unless it first rejects
any suggestion that the statute itself was not "made in Pursuance" of the Constitution.
Determining the precise reach of the Supremacy Clause is beyond the scope of this paper. 
There is at least some evidence, however, that the Founders—like their English counterparts—
viewed the common law as a complete system designed to govern all aspects of human conduct,
                    
     52See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 10; Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law:  A Structural
Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1296 (1996) ("By simultaneously granting authority to the
political branches and denying power to the states, the Constitution appears to vest exclusive and plenary
control over foreign relations in the federal government.") [hereinafter Clark, Federal Common Law].
     53Clark, Federal Common Law, supra note 52, at 1267.
     54See Prakash & Yoo, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 25, at 1522 (concluding that "sometimes deciding
the constitutionality of state legislation that conflicts with federal legislation necessarily involves judicial
review of both species of legislation").
     55Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
     56Id. at 78.
     57Id.
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either through positive rules or the absence thereof.58   On that assumption, the Supremacy Clause
arguably authorizes judicial review of virtually every federal statute challenged by the parties.59  As
Henry Hart explained, because state courts of general jurisdiction have authority "over all persons
and matters within the state's power,"60 "they have at their command a theoretically complete set of
answers for every claim of breach of private duty that might be brought before them."61  Because
states possess general police power, they remain free to recognize governing rules either through
legislation or by judicial decision.  Thus, whenever a court is asked to apply a federal statute that
contradicts state statutory or common law rules of decision, the Supremacy Clause authorizes the
court to determine whether the federal statute was "made in Pursuance" of the Constitution.  If so,
the statute constitutes "the supreme Law of the Land," and displaces contrary state law.  If not, the
statute binds neither state nor federal courts under the Supremacy Clause.62
The second half of the Supremacy Clause provides additional support for judicial review of
federal statutes alleged to exceed the scope of Congress' enumerated powers.  After defining "the
supreme Law of the Land," the Clause directs that "the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."63  In so doing,
the Clause "impressed state judges into national service, obliging them not only to subordinate their
own state law obligations to federal ones, but also actively to police state law and void any (even the
most fundamental) if it was inconsistent with any (even the least important) federal law."64   In order
                    
     58See 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 3012 (1799) (statement of Mr. Nicholas) (describing the common law of
England as "a complete system for the management of all the affairs of a country").
     59Cf. Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States:  Positivism and Judicial Federalism
after Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1504 (1997) (explaining that a federal court's erroneous prediction that a
state's highest court would adopt a novel cause of action alters the legal rights and obligations of the parties
before the court).
     60Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 492 (1954).
     61Id.
     62Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), arguably supports an even broader conception of
judicial review under the Supremacy Clause.  See infra notes 239-40 and accompanying text; see also Printz
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 900 (1997) (stating that the Supremacy Clause "makes `Law of the Land' only
`Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance [of the Constitution]'") (quoting U.S. CONST. art.
IV, cl. 2); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (reviewing the constitutionality of a federal statute
banning handgun possession near schools notwithstanding the lack of a contrary state statute authorizing such
conduct).
     63U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  Caleb Nelson has recently examined this portion of the Supremacy Clause,
and concluded that the relevant language constitutes a "non obstante" clause, a provision used to overcome the
traditional rule that "repeals by implication in the law are not favored."  Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L.
REV. 225, 237-42 (2000).  The result, in his view, is that the "Supremacy Clause requires preemption [of state
law] only when the rules provided by state and federal law contradict each other, so that a court cannot
simultaneously follow both."  Id. at 303.
     64James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, "Some Effectual Power":  The Quantity and Quality of
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to comply with this command, however, state judges must identify "the supreme Law of the Land"
with precision.  Thus, whenever a party challenges the validity of a federal statute, state judges must
determine whether the statute was "made in Pursuance" of the Constitution in order to perform their
function under the Supremacy Clause.
There are several indications that federal judges were expected to review the
constitutionality of federal statutes as well.  Initial drafts of the Supremacy Clause designated "the
legislative acts of the United States made by virtue and in pursuance of the articles of Union" as "the
supreme law of the respective States"65 rather than "the supreme Law of the Land."  This difference
presumably reflected the preference of the original proponents of the Clause that state courts be
primarily responsible for applying its commands.66  In light of the Convention's decision to authorize
Congress to create lower federal courts with jurisdiction to hear cases arising under the
"Constitution," "Laws," and "Treaties" of the United States,67 however, it is not surprising that the
Committee of Style changed the relevant language to "the supreme Law of the Land."68  This phrase
"made clear that lower federal courts—no less than state courts—would be required to apply the
`Constitution,' `Laws,' and `Treaties' of the United States as rules of decision, notwithstanding
contrary state law."69
Article III, read in light of the Supremacy Clause, also supports judicial review by federal
courts.  Although the Constitution provides that state judges "shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation
to support this Constitution,"70 it does not give state courts the last word on the supremacy of federal
statutes.  Rather, in language that closely tracks the Supremacy Clause, Article III provides that the
Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction in all cases "arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority."71  As
                                                                 
Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 764 (1998).
     65James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 17, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 22 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS].
     66See infra notes 77-80, 94 and accompanying text.
     67U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
     68See Report of Committee of Style, in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 65, at 603.
     69Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 6, at 1355 n.181.
     70U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.  The oath requirement alone would not have sufficed to resolve conflicts
between state and federal law because state judges also take an oath to support their respective state
constitutions.  As Edmund Randolph recognized:  "The officers of the States are already under oath to the
States.  To preserve a due impartiality they ought to be equally bound to the Natl. Govt."  James Madison,
Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 11, 1787), in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787 at 203 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS].  Impartiality, of course, would
not guarantee federal supremacy.
     71U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.  Article III, of course, gives
the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction "with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress
shall make."  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
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James Liebman and William Ryan recently observed, "the parallel language of the `Arising Under'
and Supremacy Clauses was intentional and structurally crucial."72  Thus, while the Supremacy
Clause and the oath requirement obligate state judges to ascertain and enforce "the supreme Law of
the Land," Article III's decision to vest appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court "add[s] a yet
stronger (because independent, final, and effectual) external check on state judges—or, more
accurately, a checking up on or spot-checking of state judicial decisions to assure that state judges
are fulfilling their checking function vis-à-vis state law."73
The difference between the language of Article III and the Supremacy Clause is small, but
instructive.  Both parts of the Constitution refer to "the Laws of the United States," but only the
Supremacy Clause adds the qualification "made in Pursuance" of this Constitution.74  This variation
reflects the distinct functions that the two provisions were meant to perform.  Article III merely
establishes the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear cases arising under "the Laws of the United
States."  Jurisdiction does not depend on whether such "Laws" were "made in Pursuance" of the
Constitution.  Rather, it is enough to establish jurisdiction that a case arises under any federal
"Law"—even an unconstitutional law.75  The Supremacy Clause, by contrast, establishes a rule of
decision to be applied by courts—both state and federal—after jurisdiction attaches.  Thus, Article
III authorizes the Supreme Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction in every case challenging the
constitutionality of a federal statute, regardless of the merits of the claim.  Once jurisdiction obtains,
however, the Supremacy Clause instructs the Court to decide the case by determining whether the
statute was "made in Pursuance" of the Constitution.
Indeed, if the Supreme Court could not determine for itself whether a particular federal
statute was "made in Pursuance" of the Constitution, then arguably the Court could not effectively
perform even the basic function of ensuring that state courts comply with the Supremacy Clause. 
Opponents of judicial review might respond that the Court could ensure federal supremacy by
simply affirming all state court decisions upholding the constitutionality of federal statutes and
reversing all decisions invalidating such statutes.76  If this is what the Founders had in mind,
                    
     72Liebman & Ryan, supra note 64, at 708.
     73Id. at 771-72.
     74Compare U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, with U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
     75See Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 520 (1858) ("The judicial power covers every legislative act of
Congress, whether it be made within the limits of its delegated powers, or be an assumption of power beyond
the grants in the Constitution.").
     76They might note that Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 restricted the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction over state court decisions to cases "where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of,
or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their validity."  Judiciary Act of
1789 § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85 (1789).  Although the Act sought to prevent under- rather than over-enforcement of
federal law, the Act left the Supreme Court free on appeal to affirm a state court decision invalidating a federal
statute.  A requirement of automatic reversal would have eliminated the need for the thoughtful and balanced
opinions in cases like McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), and Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).  Thus, although McCulloch upheld the constitutionality of the statute establishing the
Bank of the United States, the Court acknowledged that
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however, then their decision to rely on state judges to strike the proper balance between state and
federal law is curious at best.  The Constitution authorizes—but does not require—Congress to
create lower federal courts.77   Although proponents of state power undoubtedly would have
preferred to deny Congress this power, they were satisfied that state judges would retain substantial
responsibility for adjudicating cases arising under federal law.78  Their calculation proved correct. 
Congress created inferior federal courts in 1789, but it did not give them general federal question
jurisdiction until 1875,79 and did not repeal the amount-in-controversy requirement until 1980.80 
Thus, the vast majority of federal question cases throughout history have been decided not by federal
courts but by state courts, subject only to appellate review by the Supreme Court.
If one concludes that the Supremacy Clause authorizes both state courts and the Supreme
Court to ascertain the constitutionality of federal statutes, then there is little reason to suppose that
inferior federal courts lack similar authority.  Such courts trace their jurisdiction in federal question
cases to the same clause in Article III that authorizes the Supreme Court to exercise appellate
jurisdiction in cases arising under the "Constitution," "Laws," and "Treaties" of the United States.81 
In addition, as Alexander Hamilton observed, there seems to be "no impediment to the establishment
of an appeal from the state courts, to the subordinate national tribunals."82  Rather, such questions
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should congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not
intrusted to the government; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a
decision come before it, to say, that such an act was not the law of the land.
=ft
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 423.
     77U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.  This power was the result of the famous Madisonian compromise at the
Constitutional Convention of 1787.  Some delegates favored establishing lower federal courts in the
Constitution itself, while others thought such courts entirely unnecessary.  To break the impasse, Madison
successfully proposed giving Congress discretion to create lower federal courts.  See James Madison, Notes on
the Constitutional Convention (June 5, 1787), in 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 70, at 125.
     78The day after adopting the Supremacy Clause, the Convention reaffirmed Congress' power to create
lower federal courts without objection.  See James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 18,
1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 65, at 46.
     79See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1980)).  The
outgoing Federalists briefly expanded federal court jurisdiction in 1801, see Act of Feb. 13, 1801, 2 Stat. 89,
but the incoming Jeffersonians promptly repealed the expansion the following year. See Act of Mar. 8, 1802, 2
Stat. 132.
     80See Act of Dec. 1, 1980, 94 Stat. 2369.
     81U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  Professor Wechsler reached a similar conclusion. See infra notes 147-51 and
accompanying text.
     82THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 463 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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appear "to be left to the discretion of the legislature."83  Because state courts review the
constitutionality of federal statutes under the Supremacy Clause, lower federal courts exercising
appellate jurisdiction would have to undertake such review as well.  More fundamentally, because
the Supremacy Clause requires lower federal courts to prefer "the supreme Law of the Land" to
contrary state law, the Clause necessarily authorizes such courts to ascertain whether a particular
federal statute was in fact "made in Pursuance" of the Constitution.84  In the end, therefore, the
power to create lower federal courts merely gives Congress discretion to determine which courts will
review the constitutionality of federal statutes, not whether courts will do so when called upon to
decide cases in accordance with the Supremacy Clause.
B. History
History confirms that the Supremacy Clause authorizes courts to review the constitutionality
of federal statutes in order to identify "the supreme Law of the Land."  Delegates to the Federal
Convention of 1787 widely acknowledged the need for supremacy with respect to matters properly
assigned to the federal government.  At the same time, delegates from small states sought ways to
prevent the new government from exceeding the bounds of its enumerated powers.  To further both
goals, the Convention ultimately adopted the carefully worded Supremacy Clause in preference to
several proposed alternatives.  This choice suggests that the Founders expected the judiciary both to
uphold the supremacy of federal law and to police the bounds of federal power.
The Convention recognized from the outset that some mechanism was necessary to secure
the supremacy of federal law adopted under the new Constitution.85  During the Articles of
Confederation, the United States in Congress operated solely through their constituent parts, and had
"no power to exact obedience, or punish disobedience to their resolutions, either by pecuniary
                    
     83Id.
     84The Supreme Court's jurisdiction over appeals from both state and lower federal courts also supports
judicial review by lower federal courts.  Through its power to create lower federal courts and control their
jurisdiction, Congress has substantial discretion to determine whether state or federal courts will adjudicate
cases arising under federal law.  In either case, the Supreme Court generally has appellate jurisdiction over
such cases. It would be odd to conclude that the Supreme Court can assess the constitutionality of federal
statutes in cases coming from state court, but not in cases coming from federal court.  This suggests that the
Supremacy Clause requires federal courts—no less than state courts—to identify and apply "the supreme Law
of the Land," that is, to determine whether an applicable federal statute was "made in Pursuance" of the
Constitution.
     85This Article examines the notes of the Federal Convention of 1787 not because they are authoritative as
to the meaning of the Constitution, but because (like The Federalist) they have "significant interpretive value
as a detailed, contemporaneous exposition of the Constitution by authors who were intimately familiar with its
legal and political background."  John F. Manning, Textualism and the Role of The Federalist in
Constitutional Adjudication, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1337, 1339 (1998).  In addition, the notes establish a
record of the proposals that the Convention actually considered, rejected, and adopted.  For these reasons, "the
recorded deliberative process that produced the texts of Article III and the Supremacy Clause is an unusually
authoritative (i.e., accurate and legitimate) source of the meaning of those texts."  Liebman & Ryan, supra
note 64, at 707.
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mulcts, by a suspension or divestiture of privileges, or by any other constitutional means."86  The
proposed Constitution addressed these defects by providing that, within its assigned powers, "the
national government would act directly on the population rather than mediately through the states."87
 At the same time, the Constitution "preserved the States as separate sources of authority and organs
of administration."88  The Founders understood that permitting the federal government and the states
to exercise concurrent power over the same individuals in the same territory would inevitably lead to
conflicts between state and federal law.89   Thus, it was essential to the success of the new
Constitution to establish a mechanism capable of resolving such conflicts and upholding the
supremacy of federal law within its proper sphere.90
The Founders considered three alternatives, each of which looked to a different branch of
government for its implementation.91  First, the Virginia Plan initially proposed authorizing the
Union to use military force to coerce the states to comply with federal law.92   Second, the Virginia
Plan suggested giving the national legislature power to negative state laws.93  Third, the New Jersey
Plan proposed requiring state courts (subject to federal appellate review) to enforce the Laws of the
United States "made by virtue & in pursuance of the powers hereby . . . vested in them" as "the
supreme law of the respective States."94  The Founders' decision to reject the first two alternatives in
                    
     86THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, at 138 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
     87JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:  POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION
169 (1996); see also Wechsler, supra note 3, at 543 ("Our constitution makers established a central
government authorized to act directly upon individuals through its own agencies—and thus they formed a
nation capable of function and growth.").
     88Wechsler, supra note 3, at 543.
     89See Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review:  A Plea for New Contexts, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1031,
1042 (1997).
     90Id.
     91For a more detailed discussion of these alternatives, see Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 6, at
1348-55.  See also RAKOVE, supra note 87, at 171-72 ("In determining how national acts could be enforced
against potential opposition, the Convention could choose among three mechanisms:  the use of coercive force
against defiant states . . . ; the negative on state laws; or the legal prosecution of individuals who violated or
interfered with national law.").
     92James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 29, 1787), in 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS,
supra note 70, at 21.
     93James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 31, 1787), in 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS,
supra note 70, at 54.
     94James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 15, 1787), in 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS,
supra note 70, at 245.  The New Jersey Plan did not authorize the creation of lower federal courts.  Rather, the
Plan proposed that all cases arising under federal law be adjudicated "by the Common Law Judiciarys of the
State[s]" in the first instance.  Id. at 243.  These decisions would have been subject to appellate review by "a
federal Judiciary . . . to consist of a supreme Tribunal."  Id. at 244.
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favor of the third has important implications for both the existence of judicial review and its role in
maintaining the federal system.
As introduced, the Virginia Plan proposed both coercive force and a congressional negative.
 Concerning the former, the Plan would have authorized the National Legislature "to call forth the
force of the Union agst. any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the articles
thereof."95  Although the Convention embraced many aspects of the Virginia Plan, the delegates
were immediately alarmed by the proposed use of force.96  James Madison "observed that the more
he reflected on the use of force, the more he doubted the practicability, the justice and the efficacy of
it when applied to people collectively and not individually.  A Union of the States containing such
an ingredient seemed to provide for its own destruction."97  Madison "hoped that such a system
would be framed as might render this recourse unnecessary."98  The Convention tabled the proposal
and never seriously entertained this alternative.99
Madison preferred the second approach, which would have given Congress broad power to
negative state laws.  As set forth in the Virginia Plan, the proposed negative would have empowered
Congress "to negative all laws passed by the several States, contravening in the opinion of the
National Legislature the articles of [the] Union."100  The Convention initially approved the negative
in this form.101  Mr. Pinkney subsequently attempted to expand the device by moving "`that the
                    
     95James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 29, 1787), in 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS,
supra note 70, at 21.
     96See James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 31, 1787), in 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS,
supra note 70, at 54 ("The use of force agst. a State, would look more like a declaration of war, than an
infliction of punishment, and would probably be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all
previous compacts by which it might be bound.").
     97Id.  Madison's views on this question were apparently unsettled until he spoke at the Convention.  See
Liebman & Ryan, supra note 64, at 710 (stating that private correspondence suggests that "Madison initially
favored authorizing the federal government to use military force to bring recalcitrant states, and particularly
state legislatures, into line with national law").
     98James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 31, 1787), in 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS,
supra note 70, at 54.
     99The New Jersey Plan subsequently proposed permitting "the federal Executive . . . to call forth ye power
of the Confederated States . . . to enforce and compel an obedience to . . . Acts [of Congress], or an
Observance of . . . Treaties."  James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 15, 1787), in 1
FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 70, at 245.  The proposal again generated decisive opposition from
delegates like Alexander Hamilton.  See James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 18,
1787), in 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 70, at 285 ("But how can this force be exerted on the States
collectively.  It is impossible.  It amounts to a war between the parties.  Foreign powers also will not be idle
spectators.  They will interpose, the confusion will increase, and a dissolution of the Union ensue.").
     100James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 29, 1787), in 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS,
supra note 70, at 21.
     101See James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 31, 1787), in 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS,
supra note 70, at 54 (approving the negative and adding "the words `or any Treaties subsisting under the
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National Legislature shd. have authority to negative all Laws which they shd. judge to be
improper.'"102   Madison seconded the motion, stating that he "regard[ed] an indefinite power to
negative legislative acts of the States as absolutely necessary to a perfect system."103
The suggestion of an unlimited congressional negative provoked strong objections by
delegates from small states fearful of unchecked federal power.  For example, Elbridge Gerry
declared that "[t]he Natl. Legislature with such a power may enslave the States.  Such an idea as this
will never be acceded to."104  Similarly, "Mr. Butler was vehement agst. the Negative in the
proposed extent, as cutting off all hope of equal justice to the distant States.  The people there would
not he was sure give it a hearing."105  These objections were decisive and the Convention rejected
Pinckney's proposal to expand the negative.106
The Convention subsequently rejected even the original congressional negative.  Although
limited on its face, the negative would have allowed Congress to determine for itself the scope of its
powers vis-à-vis the states.  This result was simply unacceptable to a majority of states at the
Convention.107  Thus, the day after granting the states equal suffrage in the Senate,108 the
Convention reconsidered and rejected the congressional negative.109  On this occasion, delegates
                                                                 
authority of the Union'" to the end of the clause).
     102James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 8, 1787), in 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS,
supra note 70, at 164.
     103Id.
     104Id. at 165.
     105Id. at 168.
     106Id.  Near the end of the Convention, several delegates attempted to revive an essentially unlimited
congressional power "`[t]o negative all laws passed by the several States interfering in the opinion of the
Legislature with the General interests and the harmony of the Union.'"  James Madison, Notes on the
Constitutional Convention (Aug. 23, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 65, at 390.  Although this
version of the negative would have required "that two thirds of the members of each House assent to" its
exercise, id., opponents nevertheless objected in strong terms:  "If nothing else, this alone would damn and
ought to damn the Constitution.  Will any State ever agree to be bound hand & foot in this manner."  Id. at
391.  The Convention again rejected the congressional negative.  Id.
     107Consider, for example, how Congress might have used the negative to resolve the questions presented by
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).  Congress enacted a law establishing the Bank of the
United States.  Maryland reacted by taxing the operations of the Bank and denying the existence of federal
power.  Id. at 317.  If Congress had the negative, it could have simply invalidated the Maryland law as
"contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of the Union"—specifically, the articles of
the Union that authorized Congress to establish the Bank.  Under the Supremacy Clause, of course, the
judiciary, rather than Congress, resolves such questions. See infra notes 210-25 and accompanying text.
     108See James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 16, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS,
supra note 65, at 15-16.
     109See James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 17, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS,
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from small states voiced strong opposition to any congressional negative.  These members
considered the negative to be both unwarranted and impracticable.110  Madison attempted to defend
the negative,111 but influential delegates remained unconvinced.  Madison reports that "Mr. Govr.
Morris was more & more opposed to the negative.  The proposal of it would disgust all the States.  A
law that ought to be negatived will be set aside in the Judiciary departmt. and if that security should
fail; may be repealed by a Nationl. law."112   The Convention rejected "the power of negativing laws
of States" by a vote of seven states to three.113
Immediately after rejecting the congressional negative, the Convention adopted the
Supremacy Clause,114 "thereby delegating to judges (state and federal) what previously had been the
[negative's] function of voiding state law contrary to federal law."115  The Supremacy Clause,
however, did not merely reassign to courts the task of upholding the supremacy of federal law.  It
also required courts to police the bounds of federal power by conditioning the supremacy of federal
statutes on compliance with "this Constitution."  Significantly, every version of the Supremacy
Clause considered by the Convention conditioned the supremacy of federal statutes on their fidelity
to the Constitution.  For example, as first proposed as part of the New Jersey Plan, the Clause
confined "the supreme law of the respective States" to "all Acts of the U. States in Congs. made by
virtue & in pursuance of the powers hereby & by the articles of confederation vested in them."116 
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     112Id.  Liebman and Ryan suggest that Gouverneur Morris' opposition to the negative may have been
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     113James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 17, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS,
supra note 65, at 28.
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     115Liebman & Ryan, supra note 64, at 730.
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Similarly, the version adopted following rejection of the congressional negative recognized "the
legislative acts of the United States made by virtue and in pursuance of the articles of Union" as "the
supreme law of the respective States."117   As finally adopted, the Supremacy Clause designates "the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance" of "[t]his Constitution" as "the
supreme Law of the Land."118   Thus, under every version of the Clause, state courts were required
to disregard state law in favor of contrary federal statutes only if they determined that the statutes
themselves were constitutional.
During the ratification debates, moreover, supporters of the proposed Constitution repeatedly
stressed the conditional nature of federal supremacy in order to reassure those who feared unlimited
federal power.119   In Massachusetts, for example, Cassius defended the Supremacy Clause, "which
knaves and blockheads have so often dressed up in false colours."120  After quoting the Clause in
full, he explained how the Clause would actually constrain the federal government:
This is the article which they say is so arbitrary and tyrannical, that unless you have a
bill of rights to secure you, you are ruined forever.  But in the name of common
sense I would ask, . . . would it not be much easier to resort to the federal
constitution, to see if therein power is given to Congress to make the law in question.
 If such power is not given, the law is in fact a nullity, and the people will not be
bound thereby.  For let it be remembered, that such laws, and such only, as are
founded on this constitution, are to be the supreme law of the land . . . .121
George Nicholas, of Virginia, made similar assurances.  He stressed that the Supremacy Clause does
not "in any manner give them this unlimited power, because this [Clause] only declares those laws
binding which are made in pursuance of or in conformity to the particular powers given by the
constitution."122
Similarly, in Federalist 33, Alexander Hamilton defended the Supremacy Clause by
emphasizing its limits:
If a number of political societies enter into a larger political society, the laws which
the latter may enact, pursuant to the powers intrusted [sic] to it by its constitution,
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must necessarily be supreme over those societies and the individuals of whom they
are composed. . . . But it will not follow from this doctrine that acts of the larger
society which are not pursuant to its constitutional powers, but which are invasions
of the residuary authorities of the smaller societies, will become the supreme law of
the land.  These will be merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be treated as
such."123
Although he thought that such a limitation would have been implicit in any event, Hamilton stressed
that the Supremacy Clause "expressly confines this supremacy to laws made pursuant to the
Constitution."124
The Founders' decision to adopt the Supremacy Clause rather than the congressional
negative strongly supports judicial review to police the bounds of federal power.  As Jack Rakove
has explained, "federalism questions were central to the origins of judicial review" because
federalism "requires mechanisms to resolve the conflicts that arise when national and state
legislation overlap."125  "The decision to rely on courts—rather than Congress or the President—
suggests that the Founders wanted conflicts between state and federal law to be resolved by
principled adjudication, rather than political will or force."126  The Founders selected the Supremacy
Clause over the congressional negative primarily because the small states refused to entrust
Congress with unchecked power.  As initially approved, the negative would have empowered
Congress "to negative all laws passed by the several States, contravening in the opinion of the
National Legislature the articles of the Union."127  By leaving this determination to Congress, the
negative would have effectively vested Congress with plenary power to suspend state law.128  For
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review of federal laws, Congress would, in effect, have the unchecked power to veto state legislation").
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this reason, the Convention rejected the negative and adopted the mechanism favored by proponents
of state power:  the Supremacy Clause.  Unlike the negative, the Supremacy Clause assigned
resolution of federal-state conflicts to courts (both state and federal).  Thus, modern suggestions that
the Founders meant to deny courts power to review the constitutionality of federal statutes contradict
the historical record, and would effectively nullify the Founders' decision to adopt the Supremacy
Clause instead of the congressional negative.
C. Structure
Several aspects of the constitutional structure reinforce the conclusion that the Supremacy
Clause authorizes courts to police the bounds of federal power in the course of identifying "the
supreme Law of the Land."  First, this reading of the Clause upholds constitutional federalism
because it furthers the principle that the powers not delegated to the federal government are reserved
to the states or to the people.  Second, judicial review under the Supremacy Clause reinforces the
constitutional separation of powers because it prevents Congress from authoritatively judging the
scope of its own powers.  Third, judicial review is necessary to respect the written Constitution and
Article V's procedures for adopting constitutional amendments.  Abandoning judicial review to
inquire whether federal statutes were "made in Pursuance" of the Constitution would undermine
each of these essential features of the constitutional structure.
First, the Founders understood the Constitution to assign limited powers to the federal
government and to leave the remainder with the states and the people.  As James Madison explained:
 "The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined.
 Those which are to remain in the state governments are numerous and indefinite."129  The
Supremacy Clause helps to maintain this constitutional division of power by requiring courts to
disregard state law in favor of federal statutes only if the latter were "made in Pursuance" of the
Constitution.  For this reason, the "judicial power was justly regarded as indispensable, not merely to
maintain the supremacy of the laws of the United States, but also to guard the States from any
encroachment upon their reserved rights by the General Government."130
Permitting Congress to exceed the scope of its enumerated powers with impunity would
threaten the constitutional division of power between the federal government and the states.  Indeed,
denying judicial review of federal statutes under the Supremacy Clause would effectively give
Congress greater power than the proposed congressional negative.  The negative would have merely
allowed Congress to suspend state laws; it conferred no congressional power to transform federal
commands into supreme law binding throughout the nation.131  By contrast, permitting Congress to
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     130Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 520 (1858).
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exercise legislative power unchecked by judicial review would give Congress complete discretion to
replace state law with affirmative federal law of its choosing.  This would transform the Supremacy
Clause from a provision designed to keep the states and the federal government within their proper
spheres into a means of enforcing unlimited federal power.
Second, by enlisting courts—both state and federal—to uphold the limits of federal power,
the Founders established an important check against the excessive accumulation of power by a
single branch of government.  The congressional negative—initially embraced but ultimately
rejected by the Convention—would have allowed Congress to judge the scope of its own powers
vis-à-vis the states and the people.132  The Founders undoubtedly preferred the Supremacy Clause in
part because of the widely held view that no one should be the judge in his own cause.133 
Reassigning resolution of conflicts between state and federal law from Congress to the courts thus
reinforced an important aspect of the constitutional separation of powers.
Both state and federal courts enjoy significant independence from Congress.  State courts are
creatures of state law and are thus generally insulated from congressional coercion or control. 
Similarly, by design, federal judges enjoy substantial independence from the political branches by
virtue of the constitutional guarantees of life tenure and salary protection.134  The structural
independence of the judiciary suggests that the Supremacy Clause was designed to keep both the
federal government and the states within their constitutionally defined spheres.  As James Wilson
explained during the ratification debates:
If a law should be made inconsistent with those powers vested by this instrument in
Congress, the judges, as a consequence of their independence, and the particular
powers of government being defined, will declare such law to be null and void.  For
the power of the Constitution predominates.  Anything, therefore, that shall be
enacted by Congress contrary thereto will not have the force of law.135
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Denying courts the power to review the constitutionality of federal statutes under the Supremacy
Clause would undermine this important structural check and effectively reverse the Founders'
decision to adopt the Supremacy Clause instead of the congressional negative.
Third, by confining the supremacy of federal statutes to those "made in Pursuance" of "[t]his
Constitution," the Supremacy Clause upholds the written Constitution as the highest form of federal
law.136  In the absence of such qualifying language, the "Laws of the United States" and the
"Constitution" arguably could have claimed equal status as "the supreme Law of the Land," leaving
courts without clear guidance in the event of a conflict.  Thus, interpreting the Supremacy Clause to
authorize judicial review of federal statutes reinforces the distinctive character of the American
Constitution as fundamental law of the highest order.137
Similarly, if all "Laws" enacted by Congress qualified as "the supreme Law of the Land,"
then Congress and the President could effectively amend the Constitution by ordinary legislation. 
This would contradict the spirit, if not the letter, of Article V, which establishes precise procedures
to govern constitutional amendments.138  As Henry Monaghan has explained, "Article V was
designed to permit a very small number of states (currently thirteen) containing but a fraction of the
total national population to block constitutional change."139   Allowing Congress and the President to
alter the Constitution by ordinary legislation—unchecked by judicial review—would circumvent
Article V's carefully crafted procedures.140  Justice Harlan made this point explicitly in Oregon v.
                                                                 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 517 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976).
     136See Prakash & Yoo, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 25, at 1503 (stating that "like judicial review
generally, judicial review of state legislation was simply understood to follow from the nature of a written
limited Constitution").
     137See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC:  1776-1787, at 259-61 (1969)
(contrasting "the Americans' peculiar conception of a constitution" with the inability of eighteenth-century
Englishmen to "conceive of the constitution as anything anterior and superior to government and ordinary
law"); Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review Revisited, or How the Marshall Court Made More
Out of Less, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 787, 793 (1999) (suggesting that judicial review flowed "from
fundamental changes taking place in the Americans' ideas of government and law" during the 1780s and
1790s).
     138See John Harrison, The Constitutional Origins and Implications of Judicial Review, 84 VA. L. REV. 333,
348 (1998); see also Prakash & Yoo, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 25, at 1470 ("We doubt that the
Constitution permits Congress to effectively amend the Constitution outside Article V's cumbersome
procedure.  Yet this would be the practical result in a world without judicial review.").
     139Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 121, 125 (1996).
     140See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 6, at 1331 ("Both the specificity of, and the purposeful




In Article V, the Framers expressed the view that the political restraints on Congress
alone were an insufficient control over the process of constitution making.  The
concurrence of two-thirds of each House and of three-fourths of the States was
needed for the political check to be adequate.  To allow a simple majority of
Congress to have final say on matters of constitutional interpretation is therefore
fundamentally out of keeping with the constitutional structure.142
For these reasons, the text, history, and structure of the Constitution support judicial review of
federal statutes to police the constitutional limits of federal power.
D. Counterarguments
Some opponents of judicial review do not merely contest its availability to invalidate statutes
that exceed the scope of Congress' enumerated powers.  Rather, they argue more broadly that courts
lack clear constitutional authority to set aside any federal statute, at least if enacted in accordance
with the procedures set forth in Article I, Section 7.  The Supremacy Clause undercuts these claims
as well.
In 1958, for example, Learned Hand famously declared that "[t]here was nothing in the
United States Constitution that gave courts any authority to review the decisions of Congress."143   In
addition, he specifically denied that "any support for the doctrine of the supremacy of the judiciary
[can] be found in the `Supremacy Clause.'"144  In his view, "the clause was obviously directed
against the states alone to prevent their intruding upon the powers they had delegated or failing to
obey limitations on their own powers that they had accepted."145   Hand's conclusion, however, is
curious in light of his willingness to admit arguendo "that when a conflict is between a federal law
and a state law or constitution, the state court is to determine the validity of the federal law quoad
the federal constitution," and "that on some occasions the Supreme Court might have to decide
whether a state court's construction of the Constitution was correct."146
Interestingly, it was Herbert Wechsler who refuted Judge Hand's assertions the following
year.  Without discussing the political safeguards of federalism, Professor Wechsler stated that he
had "not the slightest doubt regarding the legitimacy of judicial review, whether the action called in
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question . . . is legislative or executive, federal or state."147  Wechsler quoted the Supremacy Clause
in full and explained that judicial review "is grounded in the language of the Constitution and is not
a mere interpolation."148  Wechsler declined to read the Supremacy Clause merely "as a grant of
jurisdiction to state courts, implying a denial of the power and duty to all others."149  Rather, he
interpreted Article III to mean "that if a state court passes on a constitutional issue, as the supremacy
clause provides that it should, its judgment is reviewable, subject to congressional exceptions, by the
Supreme Court, in which event that court must have no less authority and duty to accord priority to
constitutional provisions than the court that it reviews."150  In this circumstance, Wechsler did not
think it possible to conclude
that if Congress opts, as it has opted, to create a set of lower courts, those courts in
cases falling within their respective jurisdictions and the Supreme Court when it
passes on their judgments are less or differently constrained by the supremacy clause
than are the state courts, and the Supreme Court when it reviews their judgments.151
Alexander Bickel advanced a more textually grounded objection to judicial review.  He
narrowly construed the Supremacy Clause and concluded that the "authority to determine the
meaning and application of a written constitution is nowhere defined or even mentioned in the
document itself."152  In Professor Bickel's view, the phrase "Laws . . . made in Pursuance" of the
Constitution refers solely to the procedural constraints set forth in Article I, Section 7:
[I]t fully meets all else that is compelling in the language of the clause simply to
conclude that the proviso that only those federal statutes are to be supreme which are
made in pursuance of the Constitution means that the statutes must carry the outer
indicia of validity lent them by enactment in accordance with the constitutional
forms.  If so enacted, a federal statute is constitutional.153
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If Bickel is correct, then all courts—whether state or federal, trial or appellate—must simply accept
properly enacted federal statutes as "the supreme Law of the Land" without inquiring into their
constitutionality.
The Supremacy Clause undoubtedly incorporates the procedural safeguards that Professor
Bickel invoked.154  But the text in question is not so limited, and the history of the Clause contradicts
Bickel's interpretation.  As discussed, the New Jersey Plan originally referred to "all Acts of the U.
States in Congs. made by virtue & in pursuance of the powers hereby & by the articles of
confederation vested in them."155  Federal statutes not made "in pursuance of" such "powers,"
therefore, would not qualify as "the supreme law of the respective States."156  All subsequent
versions of the Clause contained similar language conditioning the supremacy of federal statutes on
their constitutionality.157  As reported by the Committee of Detail, for example, the Clause restricted
supremacy to the "Acts of the Legislature of the United States made in Pursuance of this
Constitution."158  Similarly, as adopted, the Clause refers to "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof."159
On its face, this language is not limited to federal statutes enacted pursuant to federal
lawmaking procedures.  First, the term "Laws," by itself, refers to federal statutes adopted according
to Article I, Section 7.  That section provides that every bill "shall, before it becomes a Law," be
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passed by both houses of Congress and presented to the President.160  Thus, if the Supremacy Clause
was meant to confer supremacy on all "Laws of the United States" enacted by Congress and the
President, then the qualifying language immediately following this reference was simply
unnecessary.  Second, the Supremacy Clause refers to "Laws" "made in Pursuance" of "[t]his
Constitution."  "This Constitution" most naturally refers to the entire Constitution, not just Article I,
Section 7.
Those who ratified the Constitution expressed this understanding.  As discussed, George
Nicholas of Virginia read the Clause to encompass only those federal statutes "made in pursuance of
or in conformity to the particular powers given by the constitution."161  Similarly, Thomas McKean
explained at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention:
The meaning which appears to be plain and well expressed is simply this, that Congress have
the power of making laws upon any subject over which the proposed plan gives them
a jurisdiction, and that those laws, thus made in pursuance of the Constitution, shall
be binding upon the states.162
Significantly, neither Professor Bickel nor any other commentator cites even a single remark from
the founding era expressing the more restrictive view that "Laws . . . made in Pursuance" of "this
Constitution" refers solely to laws enacted according to federal lawmaking procedures.
Focusing on additional language in the Supremacy Clause, David Currie suggests an
alternative interpretation that he believes "furnishes a powerful argument against judicial review of
Acts of Congress."163  This interpretation contrasts the language used by the Clause to describe
"Laws," on the one hand, and "Treaties," on the other.  As discussed, the Clause recognizes
"Laws . . . made in Pursuance" of "[t]his Constitution" as "the supreme Law of the Land."  "Yet the
same clause also gives supremacy to `all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States.'"164  According to Professor Currie, "this provision embraces treaties made both
before and after adoption of the Constitution."165  In his view, "the contrast strongly suggests that the
reference to laws made in pursuance of `this Constitution' was meant to distinguish those made
under the Articles of Confederation."166  Thus, Professor Currie suggests that the phrase "Laws . . .
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made in Pursuance" of "[t]his Constitution" was solely a temporal reference with few implications
for judicial review.
There are several difficulties, however, with this interpretation.  First, there is no real
evidence that the Founders understood the phrase in this sense.  As originally adopted by the
Convention, the Supremacy Clause provided that "the legislative acts of the United States made by
virtue and in pursuance of the articles of Union and all Treaties made and ratified under the authority
of the United States shall be the supreme law of the respective States."167  The additional language
regarding treaties upon which Professor Currie relies was not added until the end of the Convention
out of an abundance of caution.  In order to avoid ambiguity, Madison moved to amend the phrase
"all Treaties made under the authority of the U.S."168 to read "all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States."169  According to Madison's notes, this change was
adopted without objection and was simply "meant to obviate all doubt concerning the force of
treaties preexisting, by making the words `all treaties made' to refer to them, as the words inserted
would refer to future treaties."170  Thus, it seems unlikely that a phrase originally adopted on July 17,
1787 to describe "Laws" was intended to differentiate itself from a phrase subsequently adopted on
August 25, 1787 to describe "Treaties."
Second, even if the phrase was designed in part for this purpose, there is no indication that
the language used to qualify "Laws" was intended to have solely temporal significance.  In fact,
there is significant evidence to the contrary.  As discussed above, the text, history, and structure of
the Constitution suggest that the Founders understood "Laws . . . made in Pursuance" of "[t]his
Constitution" to refer to statutes within the scope of Congress' enumerated powers.  Thus, even
assuming that the Supremacy Clause was intended to distinguish pre-existing "Treaties" from
newly-enacted "Laws," the Clause was also understood more generally to condition the supremacy
of federal statutes on adherence to the limits of Congress' enumerated powers.  Contrary to Professor
Currie's suggestion, the two functions are not mutually exclusive.
Third, the distinct language relating to "Laws" and "Treaties" may actually support judicial
review of federal statutes.  The Founders understood that "Laws" and "Treaties" would serve
different purposes, and therefore established distinct procedures to govern their adoption.171  Treaties
                                                                 
Congress after the re-establishment and reconstitution of Congress pursuant to the Constitution itself shall be
the supreme law of the land").
     167Journal of the Constitutional Convention (July 17, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 65, at
22.
     168James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 23, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS,
supra note 65, at 389.
     169U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added); see James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention
(Aug. 25, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 65, at 417.
     170James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 25, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS,
supra note 65, at 417.
     171See Clark, Federal Common Law, supra note 6, at 1331 (noting "the specificity of, and the purposeful
variations among, the procedures prescribed by the Constitution for adopting the `Constitution,' `Laws,' and
`Treaties'").
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concern our external relations with foreign nations, whereas laws generally focus on domestic
matters.  Although the Founders assigned nearly complete power over foreign relations to federal
officials,172 they were simply unwilling to delegate similarly broad authority over internal affairs to
the new federal government.173  Given the distinct functions that "Laws" and "Treaties" were meant
to perform, it is not surprising that the Constitution expressly conditions the supremacy of federal
statutes on adherence to the limits of federal power.174
III. Reassessing the Double Standard of Judicial Review
The conditional nature of the Supremacy Clause undercuts modern suggestions that the
Clause authorizes judicial review of state law alleged to conflict with federal law, but does not
authorize judicial review of federal statutes alleged to exceed the scope of Congress' enumerated
powers.  By the terms of the Clause, whenever state law contradicts a federal statute, courts can
resolve the conflict only by inquiring whether the federal statute was "made in Pursuance" of the
Constitution.  An affirmative answer means that the statute constitutes "the supreme Law of the
Land," and that courts must disregard contrary state law.  A negative answer, by contrast, means that
courts have no warrant to displace state law.
As discussed, proponents of the political safeguards approach urge courts to abandon judicial
review of federal statutes alleged to exceed the scope of Congress' enumerated powers, but to
continue judicial review of state law alleged to conflict with such statutes.  In their view, "[t]he
prime function envisaged for judicial review—in relation to federalism—was the maintenance of
national supremacy against nullification or usurpation by the individual states."175  In a recent article,
                    
     172See Clark, supra note 52, at 1294-99; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 264 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other
nations.").  Even antifederalists like Thomas Jefferson considered "`it indispensably necessary that with
respect to everything external we be one nation firmly hooped together.'"  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
James Madison (Oct. 8, 1786) in CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 46 (1937).  But cf.
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law:  A Critique
of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 863 (1997) (citations omitted) (stating that "the natural
inference is that Article I, Section 10's self-executing limitations on state power in foreign relations are
exhaustive and that other foreign relations activities fall within the concurrent authority of the state and federal
governments until the federal political branches exercise their foreign relations powers in a manner that
preempts state law").
     173Clark, Federal Common Law, supra note 52, at 1260.
     174This is not to say that there are no constraints on the federal government's ability to expand its authority
through the treaty-making process.  See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (stating that "no agreement with
a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of Government, which is free from
the restraints of the Constitution").
     175Wechsler, supra note 3, at 559; see supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.  Even Professors Prakash
and Yoo seem to accept this view.  See Prakash & Yoo, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 25, at 1492 ("While
judicial review arose in the context of protecting the national government from the states, this development
still shows that the idea of courts invalidating legislation at odds with the Constitution was nowhere near as
unfamiliar to the Framers as some might think.").
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Larry Kramer has reiterated and sharpened this thesis.  Professor Kramer believes that  "the Framers
clearly decided to adopt judicial review as a device for controlling state laws,"176  but that "the
power of courts to review federal legislation was left unaddressed."177  Kramer identifies the
Supremacy Clause as the reason for this dichotomy.  He characterizes the Clause as "[a]n express
command for judges to prefer federal to state law."178  He maintains that after adopting of the
Supremacy Clause, "the delegates assumed the existence of judicial review over state laws in their
deliberations."179  In his view, however, "[n]o similar decision was made to authorize judicial review
of federal legislation."180  Indeed, Kramer asserts that the Founders not only failed to authorize
judicial review of federal statutes, but affirmatively "believed that the provisions delegating powers
[to Congress] were not proper subjects for judicial involvement."181  For these reasons, Kramer
concludes that the Founders envisioned judicial review only with respect to state law.182
Professor Kramer's account fails to appreciate the conditional nature of the Supremacy
Clause.  "As is evident from its text, . . . the Supremacy Clause enshrines as `the supreme Law of the
Land' only those Federal Acts that accord with the constitutional design.  Appeal to the Supremacy
Clause alone merely raises the question whether a law is a valid exercise of the national power."183 
Thus, in every case, before a court can recognize a federal statute as "the supreme Law of the Land,"
it must review claims that the statute in question was not "made in Pursuance" of the Constitution.184
                    
     176Kramer, We the Court, supra note 4, at 61.
     177Id. at 67.
     178Id. at 63.
     179Id. at 63-64.
     180Id. at 64.
     181Id. at 125.
     182See id. at 64; Kramer, Politics, supra note 4, at 242-43.  In a sense, modern scholarship has attempted to
constitutionalize Justice Holmes' well-known aphorism: "I do not think the United States would come to an
end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void.  I do think the Union would be imperiled if we
could not make that declaration as to the laws of the several States."  OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law and the
Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291, 295-96 (1920).  Holmes himself, of course, understood the
Constitution to permit judicial review of both federal and state law.
     183Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 731 (1999) (citations omitted).
     184Cf. Prakash & Yoo, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 25, at 1468 ("If a state law conflicts with a federal
law but the federal law itself is unconstitutional, then the state court may be under no Article VI obligation to
invalidate the state law."); Rakove, supra note 89, at 1036 ("What is the Supremacy Clause about if it is not
about something we would readily recognize as judicial review?").  John Harrison recognizes the argument
that "a statute inconsistent with the Constitution is not adopted pursuant to it," but suggests this reasoning
"beg[s] the question posed by the possibility that a statute and the Constitution can be inconsistent, which is
whether the Constitution's implicit rule is that it prevails when in conflict with a statute."  Harrison, supra note
138, at 346 n.48.
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 In short, the Supremacy Clause provides an express textual basis for judicial review of federal
statutes alleged to exceed the scope of federal powers because such review is a prerequisite to
judicial review of state law under the Clause.185
Recalling the conditional nature of federal supremacy helps to explain events at the
Constitutional Convention that Professor Kramer finds puzzling.  For example, Kramer observes that
immediately after the defeat of the congressional negative, "Luther Martin moved to incorporate into
the Constitution the proposed Supremacy Clause from the defeated New Jersey Plan."186  According
to Kramer:
Martin's decision to move this amendment after the legislative veto had already been
defeated is curious.  If, as Sherman and Morris had suggested, a legislative veto was
unnecessary because judicial review was already implicit, why move after the veto
had been voted down to add a provision explicitly ordering state judges to treat
federal law as supreme?  And why do so if you are Luther Martin and interested
mostly in keeping any limits on state power as weak as possible?187
Kramer speculates that Martin wanted "to ensure that the legislative veto was dead once and for
all."188  But Martin's motion was more than a defensive maneuver.  Martin sought adoption of the
Supremacy Clause for the same reason that William Paterson originally proposed it as part of the
New Jersey Plan—to authorize courts to check federal as well as state power.
Kramer's mistake lies in reading the Supremacy Clause as a one-sided provision that solely
favors the federal government at the expense of the states.  In fact, the Clause was designed to be a
double-edged sword—that is, an authorization for courts to keep both the federal government and
the states within their proper spheres.  The Clause requires courts to prefer federal statutes to state
law, but only if the statutes in question were "made in Pursuance" of the Constitution.189  For this
reason, Martin's motion was undoubtedly motivated, at least in part, by his desire to protect the states
against unwarranted federal legislation.  He knew that if Congress exceeded its constitutional
powers, the Supremacy Clause—unlike the congressional negative—authorized courts to ignore the
results and continue to apply state law.  In short, the cost of federal supremacy was judicial review. 
Under these circumstances, it is not at all "curious" that Luther Martin—a delegate committed to
                    
     185Although Professors Prakash and Yoo invoke the Supremacy Clause in support of judicial review, they
ultimately conclude "that judicial review did not directly arise from any particular provision, but instead
followed from the concept of a limited, written Constitution and the existence of a judiciary."  Prakash & Yoo,
Puzzling Persistence, supra note 25, at 1505.  The text and history of the Supremacy Clause, however, suggest
that the Founders understood the Clause to be an express authorization for both state and federal courts to
engage in judicial review of federal statutes.  See supra notes 47-128 and accompanying text.
     186Kramer, We the Court, supra note 4, at 63.
     187Id.
     188Id.
     189U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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keeping "limits on state power as weak as possible"—moved that the Convention adopt the
Supremacy Clause.
The conditional nature of the Supremacy Clause also sheds light on other matters that
Professor Kramer finds difficult to explain.  In discussing judicial review, Kramer recounts the
Convention's consideration of a Council of Revision—a proposal to vest the power to veto federal
legislation in the President and a convenient number of federal judges.190  James Wilson favored the
proposal on the ground that judicial review might prove inadequate to protect against
"encroachments on the people as well as on [the Judiciary]."191  Other delegates opposed the
proposal on the ground that it would give judges too much power in conjunction with judicial
review.  For example, Luther Martin objected that because "the Constitutionality of laws . . . will
come before the Judges in their proper official character," putting judges on the Council of Revision
would give them "a double negative."192  Likewise, George Mason thought that federal judges
"could declare an unconstitutional law void," but should give "a free course" to "every law however
unjust oppressive or pernicious, which did not come plainly under this description."193
Professor Kramer finds it "difficult to know what to make of this exchange."194  He
acknowledges that Wilson envisioned at least limited judicial review of federal statutes, and that
Martin and Mason "seemed to assume a broader power."195  Because the Council of Revision was
rejected and "no other motion was made pertaining to the role of judges," Kramer concludes that
"we are left uncertain as to what role, if any, judicial review was expected to play."196  Given that
some delegates clearly expected courts to perform judicial review, Kramer offers several possible
explanations "why none of the advocates of judicial review thought to make a motion to add this
power."197   He hypothesizes that these delegates either "did not think it important to incorporate the
power into the Constitution[,]" or "believed any effort to add such a provision would fail."198  
Kramer concludes that "[w]hatever the explanation, the power of [federal] courts to review federal
legislation was left unaddressed."199
                    
     190See Kramer, We the Court, supra note 4, at 64-66.
     191James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 21, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS,
supra note 65, at 73.
     192Id. at 73, 76.
     193Id. at 78.
     194Kramer, We the Court, supra note 4, at 66.
     195Id.
     196Id.
     197Id.
     198Id. at 67.
     199Id.
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Here again, Professor Kramer overlooks the dual role of the Supremacy Clause.  Luther
Martin had no reason to propose judicial review of federal statutes following rejection of the Council
of Revision for the simple reason that he had already proposed—and the Convention had already
approved—the Supremacy Clause.  Having successfully urged the adoption of the Clause just four
days earlier, Martin had every reason to expect that courts would exercise judicial review of federal
statutes in the course of identifying "the supreme Law of the Land."  That is the reason why, in
opposing the Council of Revision, Martin confidently declared that "the Constitutionality of laws . . .
will come before the Judges in their proper official character."200  At that point in the Convention,
another motion pertaining to judicial review would have been superfluous.  In light of the
Convention's decision to adopt the Supremacy Clause, it is simply not plausible to suggest that "the
power of courts to review federal legislation was left unaddressed."201
Opponents of judicial review might respond that even if the Supremacy Clause authorizes
courts to review the scope of federal power, the Clause does not specify the appropriate standard of
review.  Thus, commentators like Larry Kramer might argue that application of even the most
deferential standard—such as rational basis scrutiny—would satisfy any requirement of judicial
review.202  To support this contention, those who disfavor judicial review might invoke the political
safeguards of federalism.203  According to this argument, the states need judicial protection from
only the most arbitrary and irrational federal statutes because the constitutional structure permits
states to protect their prerogatives in the lawmaking process.  As one justice recently put it,
"Congress, not the courts, must remain primarily responsible for striking the appropriate state/federal
balance."204
At the outset, it is not clear why the existence of structural safeguards designed to protect the
states against the enactment of unconstitutional federal measures constitutes an excuse for upholding
such measures.  In this sense, "the political safeguards argument has always been something of a non
sequitur."205  As Michael Dorf points out, "[g]ranting that Congress will rarely act in a way that
                    
     200James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 21, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS,
supra note 65, at 76.
     201Kramer, We the Court, supra note 4, at 67.
     202Cf. Kramer, Politics, supra note 4, at 291 (urging the Supreme Court to apply no more than "rational
basis scrutiny to questions regarding the limits of Congress's power under Article I"); see United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The business of the courts is to review the
congressional assessment, not for soundness but simply for the rationality of concluding that a jurisdictional
basis exists in fact."); id. at 663 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (agreeing that "the Court's traditional `rational basis'
approach is sufficient").
     203See supra notes 11-46 and accompanying text.
     204Morrison, 529 U.S. at 660 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
     205Dorf, supra note 21, at 747.  The political safeguards approach is a bit like arguing that courts should
uphold federal statutes that invade the President's constitutional prerogatives because the Constitution gives
the President a role in the lawmaking process.  The Supreme Court rejected this approach in I.N.S. v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1983), by invalidating the legislative veto notwithstanding the President's power to veto the
offending statute.
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directly threatens state sovereignty, one important purpose of a Constitution is to provide resistance
precisely in the extreme cases when the safeguard of representative government fails."206
More fundamentally, if the Founders had regarded the political safeguards as sufficient to
protect the states' prerogatives, then it is difficult to explain their vehemence in insisting that the
congressional negative "would disgust all the States,"207 and that the states would "[n]ever agree to
be bound hand & foot in this manner."208  Presumably, the Founders would have been satisfied that
the states' role in the composition and selection of the national government would prevent Congress
from exceeding its proper authority.  In fact, the Founders were not content to rely exclusively on the
political safeguards of federalism.  Rather, they adopted the Supremacy Clause as an additional
mechanism to check federal power.
From this perspective, restricting courts to "rational basis" review of federal statutes would
defeat one of the central functions of the Supremacy Clause.  As discussed, the Clause enlisted
courts, not merely to uphold the supremacy of federal law, but also to keep the federal government
within its proper sphere.  Under the Constitution, federal courts have life tenure and salary
protection, and thus enjoy significant independence from the political branches.  State courts have
similar, and arguably greater, independence from Congress.  Such independence was undoubtedly
one of the reasons why the Founders ultimately chose courts—rather than Congress or the
President—to keep the federal government and the states within their respective spheres.  Thus,
courts could not limit themselves to rational basis scrutiny of federal statutes without effectively
surrendering to Congress one of their essential functions under the Supremacy Clause.209
IV. Historical Examples
Several prominent Supreme Court decisions recognize that courts must review the
constitutionality of federal statutes in order to perform their role under the Supremacy Clause. 
Although the Court has placed greatest reliance on the Clause in cases involving conflicts between
federal statutes and positive expressions of state law, the Court has also invoked the Clause to
support judicial review of the scope of federal power more broadly.  In all of these cases, the Court
                    
     206Dorf, supra note 21, at 747-48.
     207James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 17, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS,
supra note 65, at 28.
     208James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 23, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS,
supra note 65, at 391.
     209See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 204 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Although Congress' expression of the view that it does have power . . . is entitled to the most respectful
consideration by the judiciary, coming as it does from a coordinate branch of government, this cannot displace
the duty of this Court to make an independent determination whether Congress has exceeded its powers.")
(footnote omitted).  Of course, recognizing that courts should exercise independent judgment in reviewing the
scope of federal powers under the Supremacy Clause does not address whether courts should adopt a broad or
narrow view of such powers.  Thus, it is possible that a court exercising independent judgment would interpret
the Commerce Clause in light of modern conditions to give Congress relatively broad power.
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has suggested that ascertaining whether a federal statute was "made in Pursuance" of the
Constitution is an essential step in applying the Supremacy Clause.
Two early cases illustrate the role of the Supremacy Clause in resolving conflicts between
positive state law and federal statutes:  McCulloch v. Maryland210 and Gibbons v. Ogden.211  In
McCulloch, the Supreme Court upheld a federal statute chartering the Bank of the United States, and
in the process broadly construed Congress' power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution" its enumerated powers.212  For this reason, McCulloch is justly
regarded as one of the most important nationalist rulings handed down by the Marshall Court. 
Commentators, however, typically overlook another important aspect of the decision:  its reliance on
the Supremacy Clause to support judicial review of the scope of Congress' enumerated powers.
McCulloch was sparked by a Maryland statute attempting to tax the operations of the Bank. 
Thus, the case presented an apparent conflict between federal and state law.  As Chief Justice
Marshall observed, "the conflicting powers of the general and state governments must be brought
into view, and the supremacy of their respective laws, when they are in opposition, must be
settled."213  McCulloch did not resolve this question simply by declaring the federal statute to be "the
supreme Law of the Land."  Rather, the Court explained that the federal statute was "supreme" only
if it was made in pursuance of the Constitution.214  In other words, McCulloch expressly recognized
that the validity of Maryland's tax turned on the constitutionality of the federal statute incorporating
the Bank.
Accordingly, Marshall declared that the "first question made in this case is—has congress
power to incorporate a bank?"215  The Supreme Court's resolution of this question is familiar ground.
 After extended discussion, the Court held that Congress has implied power to incorporate a bank,216
and that the Necessary and Proper Clause does not limit—but rather augments—such power.217 
Review of the Court's opinion reminds us, however, that the Court did not undertake judicial review
of the federal statute in isolation.  Rather, the Court regarded such review as an essential step in its
application of the Supremacy Clause.  The Court began its analysis, for example, by declaring that
                    
     210McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
     211Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
     212U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
     213McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405.
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laws, when made in pursuance of the constitution, form the supreme law of the land.").
     215Id. at 401.
     216Id. at 406-11.
     217Id. at 411-21.  See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court?  The Fall of the Political Question
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 252 (2002) ("The [McCulloch] Court
described its role as policing the boundaries of legislative power, not dictating legislative conclusions within
those bounds.").
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"the government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of
action."218  Although the Court acknowledged that the Constitution does not give Congress express
power to incorporate a bank, it found such power to be an appropriate means of executing Congress'
"great powers, to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to declare and
conduct a war; and to raise and support armies and navies."219  Thus, invoking the language of the
Supremacy Clause, the Court concluded that "it is the unanimous and decided opinion of this court,
that the act to incorporate the Bank of the United States is a law made in pursuance of the
constitution, and is a part of the supreme law of the land."220
Had the McCulloch Court reached a contrary conclusion, no further inquiry would have been
necessary to uphold the Maryland statute.221  Having found the federal statute to constitute "the
supreme Law of the Land," however, the Court proceeded to inquire "[w]hether the state of
Maryland may, without violating the constitution, tax [the Bank]."222  The Court held that it may not.
 The Court found that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy."223  Thus, Maryland's attempt
to tax (i.e., destroy) the Bank of the United States conflicted with the federal statute establishing the
Bank.  In the case of such "plain repugnance" between a state law and a federal statute made in
pursuance of the Constitution, the Supremacy Clause requires state law to yield.224   According to
the Court, this is "the unavoidable consequence of that supremacy which the constitution has
declared."225
Gibbons v. Ogden226 provides a similar example.  The case involved a conflict between a
                    
     218McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405.
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     220McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 424 (emphasis added). Conversely, the Court expressly acknowledged that the
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     221See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1514 (1987) ("The clear
implication of this way of structuring the analysis . . . is that if the Bank had been unconstitutionally chartered,
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749-59 (1999) (providing a detailed and nuanced account of McCulloch).
     222McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 425.
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     226Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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New York statute granting an exclusive right to navigate all waters within the state's jurisdiction, and
a federal statute authorizing ships to navigate the waters between New York and New Jersey.  New
York courts upheld the state statute and enjoined its violation.  On appeal, the Supreme Court
resolved the conflict between state and federal law by reference to the Supremacy Clause.  The
Court emphasized that the Constitution declares "the supremacy not only of itself, but of the laws
made in pursuance of it."227  Thus, in every case in which state laws "interfere with, or are contrary
to the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the constitution,"228 the federal statute prevails.
Accordingly, the outcome of the case turned on whether the federal statute in question was
"made in Pursuance" of the Constitution.  In a more frequently cited portion of the opinion, Gibbons
interpreted the Commerce Clause to determine whether Congress had constitutional power to enact
the statute.  The Court held "that `commerce,' as the word is used in the constitution, comprehends
navigation,"229 and that Congress' power to regulate commerce "among" the several states refers to
"commerce which concerns more States than one."230  The federal statute authorized navigation
between New York and New Jersey, and therefore fell within the Congress' commerce power. 
Because the statute thus qualified as "the supreme Law of the Land," the Court held that contrary
state law "must yield."231
Several other cases invoked the Supremacy Clause to support judicial review of federal
statutes even in the absence of an obvious conflict with state law.  In Hayburn's Case,232 for
example, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a federal statute requiring federal
circuit courts to entertain claims by injured veterans for federal pensions under the Invalid Pensions
Act of 1792.233  Under the Act, courts were required to determine whether a petitioner met the
statutory qualifications, and submit the names of successful claimants to the Secretary of War.  The
Secretary, in turn, was required to place these names on the pension list except in cases of
"imposition or mistake."  Although Congress mooted the case by changing the law, the Court
reporter set forth "the reasons assigned by the [lower court] judges, for declining to execute the first
act of Congress."234
For example, Justices Wilson and Blair, sitting on the circuit court for the District of
Pennsylvania, concluded that the Act was unconstitutional and that the court could not implement
the Act.  The court reasoned that the "constitution is `the supreme law of the land,'" and that "`all
judicial officers of the United States are bound, by oath or affirmation, to support'" this supreme
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law.235  The court concluded that the Act violated the constitutional separation of powers and was
"radically inconsistent with the independence of that judicial power that is vested in the courts."236 
Faced with the choice of acting "contrary either to the obvious directions of congress, or to a
constitutional principle, in our judgment equally obvious,"237 the court chose to follow the
Constitution.238
A decade later, in Marbury v. Madison,239 the Supreme Court found Congress' attempt to
confer original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus unconstitutional
under Article III.  Although not central to its reasoning, the Court invoked the Supremacy Clause at
the end of its opinion to support judicial review:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the
supreme law of the land, . . . not the laws of the United States generally, but those
only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.  Thus, the
particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and
strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a
law repugnant to the constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other
departments, are bound by that instrument.240
Hepburn v. Griswold241 placed even greater reliance on the Supremacy Clause.  Hepburn
presented the question "whether Congress has power to make notes issued under its authority a legal
tender in payment of debts, which, when contracted, were payable by law in gold and silver coin."242
 The "law" Congress sought to displace in Hepburn was not state law in the modern sense, but rather
the "general principles of commercial law" or the "law merchant."243  Such law gave the holder of a
promissory note a "private right" to recover the sum specified by the note in gold and silver.244  The
holder sued for payment and the debtor defended on the ground that a federal statute authorized
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payment in United States notes.245  The plaintiff replied that the statute was without legal force or
effect because it exceeded Congress' constitutionally assigned powers.246
The Supreme Court did not pause to inquire whether the federal statute conflicted with state
law per se.  Rather, the Court proceeded to examine whether the Constitution authorized the statute
in question.  After quoting the Supremacy Clause in full, the Court explained:  "Not every act of
Congress . . . is to be regarded as the supreme law of the land; nor is it by every act of Congress that
the judges are bound.  This character and this force belong only to such acts as are `made in
pursuance of the Constitution.'"247  On the merits, the Court concluded that Congress lacked express
or implied power to make its notes legal tender for pre-existing debts.248  Accordingly,
notwithstanding the federal statute, the Court held that the defendants lacked a valid excuse for
failure to pay the note in gold and silver coin.
The Hepburn Court rejected the suggestion "that this is not a question for the court deciding
a cause, but for Congress exercising the power."249  In the Court's view, permitting Congress to
determine the extent of its own powers "would completely change the nature of American
government."250
It would convert the government, which the people ordained as a government of
limited powers, into a government of unlimited powers.  It would confuse the
boundaries which separate the executive and judicial from the legislative authority. 
It would obliterate every criterion which this court, speaking through the venerated
Chief Justice . . . , established for the determination of the question whether
legislative acts are constitutional or unconstitutional.251
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the federal statute was not "made in pursuance" of the
Constitution and could not alter the private rights of the parties before the Court.252
Since these early cases were decided, courts and commentators have largely forgotten the
conditional nature of the Supremacy Clause and now generally take for granted both federal
supremacy and judicial review.  Thus, one need not cite the Supremacy Clause for the seemingly
self-evident proposition that federal statutes trump contrary state law.  Nor do courts invoke the
Supremacy Clause—as Chief Justice Marshall did in Marbury v. Madison and McCulloch v.
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Maryland—as authority for judicial review of federal statutes.  This is why modern commentators
like Jesse Choper and Larry Kramer see no contradiction in simultaneously urging courts to uphold
the supremacy of federal statutes over contrary state law, but to refrain from invalidating federal
statutes that exceed the scope of Congress' enumerated powers.  Upon examination, however, the
Supremacy Clause does not permit courts to separate judicial review in this fashion.  The Clause
establishes, in pertinent part, that state law provides the governing rule of decision in all cases unless
and until preempted by a contrary "Law[ ] of the United States made in pursuance" of the
Constitution.  The conditional nature of the Supremacy Clause means that courts should recognize
federal statutes as "the supreme Law of the Land" if—but only if—they first review and reject any
constitutional challenges to the federal statute at issue.
Conclusion
Contrary to modern assumptions, the Supremacy Clause provides a textual basis for judicial
review of federal statutes alleged to exceed the scope of Congress' enumerated powers.  By the terms
of the Clause, federal statutes qualify as "the supreme Law of the Land" only if they are "made in
Pursuance" of "[t]his Constitution."  By conditioning the supremacy of federal statutes on their
constitutionality, the Clause simultaneously performs two distinct functions:  ensuring the
supremacy of federal law and upholding the limits of federal power.  Although commentators
generally regard the Clause as concerned solely with the first function, the second function was at
least as important to those who framed and ratified the Supremacy Clause.  Properly understood, the
Clause does not permit courts to separate judicial review of state law alleged to conflict with federal
statutes from judicial review of the federal statutes themselves.  Rather, the text, history, and
structure of the Constitution suggest that the Supremacy Clause necessarily authorizes courts to
review the constitutionality of federal statutes in the course of identifying "the supreme Law of the
Land."
